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Children's Rights to Equality: Protection
Versus Paternalism
Colleen Sheppard *
INTRODUCTION
The idea of according equality rights to children is a relatively
recent phenomenon. Historically, society did not accord children
rights; children were subject to the unregulated, unscrutinized, un-
challenged private power of their parents, especially their fathers.
Recently, children's advocates have maintained that children have
rights that should be recognized and respected in the legal system.
Martha Minow, for example, has reviewed the debates about
whether we should recognize children's rights.' She rejects the
view that rights are limited to claims made by autonomous adult
individuals for independence and freedom. Instead, Minow ex-
plains how rights "arise in the context of relationships among peo-
ple who are themselves interdependent and mutually defining," '2
thus making them more relevant to children's lives. In essence,
they can be understood as determining the "legal consequences for
particular patterns of human and institutional relationships."3
Children's rights may take the form of claims for autonomy and
noninterference; they may, however, entail claims for care and pro-
tection, or claims for relationships with others.4
* Colleen Sheppard is an Assistant Professor with the Faculty of Law at McGill
University in Montreal, Canada. She received her LL.B. at University of Toronto in
1984, and her LL.M. from Harvard University Law School in 1985. Professor Sheppard
has written and presented papers in the area of women's rights and discrimination.
I wish to thank Mandra Zweig and May Chiu for their research assistance and insights
into how to make equality meaningful in children's lives.
1. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE - INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990). See also Martha Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for
Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J. 1860 (1987); Martha Minow, Rights for the Next Generation:
A Feminist Approach to Children's Rights, 9 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1986); Michael S.
Wald, Children's Rights. A Framework for Analysis, in BARBARA LANDAU, CHILDREN'S
RIGHTS IN THE PRACTICE OF FAMILY LAW (Toronto: Carswell, 1986).
2. Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 1, at 1884.
3. Id. See also, Jennifer Nedelsky, Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and
Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7 (1989); Jennifer Nedelsky, Law, Boundaries and
the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (1990).
4. Minow, Interpreting Rights, supra note 1, at 1868; Minow, MAKING ALL THE DIF-
FERENCE, supra note 1, at 289.
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Beyond the question of the applicability of rights discourse is the
question of the kinds of rights and the content of children's rights.
It is in this regard that we need to think about the legal meaning of
rights such as "liberty," "security of the person," "freedom of ex-
pression," and "equality." When, how, and in what way do these
legal concepts apply to children?' How do they affect the way we
treat children in society and the legal recourse available to them in
the face of the infringement of these rights? More specifically, how
can we conceptualize equality to make it a meaningful source of
legal protection that will help to guide the legal system's treatment
of children?
In the Canadian context, there are two major sources of legal
protection for equality rights-constitutional and legislative pro-
tection. Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms6 ("Canadian Charter") guarantees individuals the right to
equal benefit and equal protection of the law, and the right not to
be discriminated against on the basis of "race, national or ethnic
origin, color, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."7
The explicit inclusion of protection against age discrimination in
our Charter directly raises the question of children's equality
rights. Human rights legislation, at both the provincial and federal
5. In the Canadian constitutional context, see Nicholas Bala and David Cruickshank,
Children and the Charter of Rights, in BARBARA LANDAU, supra note 1, and Jeffery
Wilson, Children and Equality Rights, in ANNE BAYEFSKY & MARY EBERTS, EQUALITY
RIGHTS AND THE CANADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS (Toronto: Cars-
well, 1985). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989,
G.A. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Resolution], has presented this challenge in the international human rights law
arena and prompted academic commentary. See Stephen Toope, The Convention on the
Rights of the Child: Implications for Canada (1992) (discussion paper for the Child,
Youth and Family Policy Research Centre, Toronto, Ontario, May 1992); Thomas Ham-
marberg, The U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child - And How to Make it Work,
12 H.R.Q. 97 (1990).
6. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, § 15, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982 [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
7. Section 15(1) (emphasis added). Section 15(2) states: "Subsection (1) does not
preclude any law, program or activity that has as its object the amelioration of conditions
of disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are disadvantaged because of
race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability."
Section 1 of the Charter guarantees the rights and freedoms contained in it "subject only
to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society." This provision represents a potential means for limiting constitu-
tional rights and freedoms; it also provides a mechanism for protecting certain collective
rights, such as the rights of children. See for example Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), 1
S.C.R. 927 (1989), where the Supreme Court of Canada upheld a law prohibiting com-
mercial advertising directed at children under the age of 13 pursuant to section 1, despite
its interference with freedom of expression. The Court expressed concern with the vul-
nerability of children to manipulation through advertising.
2
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 15
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol1/iss1/15
Canada: Children's Rights to Equality
level, also provides some protection against discrimination on the
basis of age." Some statutes limit the protection to certain age
groups, effectively excluding either children and/or the elderly-
the precise age groups that are often most vulnerable to age-based
discrimination. 9 These limits can be explained in part by the sig-
nificant emphasis on employment issues in human rights legisla-
tion. The Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
prohibits age discrimination except as provided by law.' °
In the face of explicit protection against age discrimination, the
question arises as to how equality rights or non-discrimination pro-
tection should be conceptualized vis-a-vis children. It is this ques-
tion that has not been fully addressed in law. One difficulty that
has arisen in applying equality rights to children stems from the
tendency to understand equality or non-discrimination as simply
mandating that all those who are alike be treated alike. If we limit
our definition of equality in this way, there does not seem to be
much room for equality for children, given the reality that they are
often not the same as adults. It makes sense to treat children dif-
ferently than adults to the extent that they are different. Thus,
being legally bound to treat children and adults the same is incon-
sistent with the common sense practice of differential treatment
based on age. The exceptions to non-discrimination seem to swal-
low up the rule and we are left wondering if legal protection
against age discrimination are more rhetorical than real.
To breathe life into non-discrimination rights for children, there-
fore, it is necessary to expand and rethink our understanding of
equality. At the core of this reconceptualization is an approach to
equality that is not premised on treating everyone the same. In-
stead, it is based on a concern for generating equality of results
potentially through the application of differential treatment to re-
spond to the myriad and diverse needs of individuals and groups in
8. See, e.g., Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6, § 3(1); Prince Edward
Island Human Rights Act, S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-12, § 1(1).
9. For example, the Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1, § 2(a),
limits its protection to those between the ages of 18 and 65. The British Columbia
Human Rights Act, (1984) S.B.C. c. 22, § 1, protects only those between the ages of 45
and 65. The New Brunswick Human Rights Code, R.S.N.B. 1973, c. H-I1, § 2, defines
age as 19 years and older. The Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19,
§ 10(1), defines age as 18 years or more, except with respect to employment discrimina-
tion, where it is defined as 18 years or more and less than 65 years. The upper age limits
on the scope of human rights protection were upheld as constitutional in a series of recent
mandatory retirement decisions. McKinney v. University of Guelph, 3 S.C.R. 229
(1990); Harrison v. University of British Columbia, 3 S.C.R. 451 (1990).
10. R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, § 10, as amended.
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society, including children. It also demands reshaping the way we
structure society to eradicate systemic inequalities and to make it
more accommodating of children's needs. Finally, it is premised
on a reconceptualization of equality rights in terms of relation-
ships. To discern the presence or absence of equality, it is helpful
to assess the character and quality of particular private and public
human relationships.
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF EQUALITY IN CANADIAN LAW
While this reconceptualization requires us to erase current con-
ceptions of equality (to the extent they are limited to an individual
equal treatment approach) to make it possible to reconstruct an
alternative understanding, the ideas I am advocating have already
entered into legal discourse about equality rights in Canada. The
idea that equality may entail differential treatment to respond to
different needs was specifically endorsed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in its first major interpretation of the equality guarantees
of the Canadian Charter." As Justice McIntyre put it, "the ac-
commodation of differences ... is the true essence of equality.' 2
The Court also explained that "every difference in treatment be-
tween individuals under the law will not necessarily result in ine-
quality and, as well that identical treatment may frequently
produce serious inequality." 3
If treating everyone in the same way is not always consistent
with equality, how do we know whether or not there is inequality?
According to the Supreme Court of Canada, to discern whether or
not there is a violation of equality rights, we have to look at the
impact of the law, policy, or practice to determine whether it
harms or disadvantages individuals from those groups in society
that have been powerless historically and subjected to discrimina-
tion, prejudice, and exclusion from societal institutions. Thus, in
some instances, treating individuals differently because of their
group affiliation may result in serious prejudice and discrimination.
In other instances, treating everyone the same may disproportion-
ately harm certain groups in society because of their particular
needs. "
11. Andrews v. Law Soc'y of British Columbia, 1 S.C.R. 143 (1989) (finding a law
requiring lawyers to be Canadian citizens discriminatory and contrary to the Charter).
12. Id. at 169.
13. Id. at 164.
14. This second form of discrimination is referred to as "adverse effect" discrimina-
tion. Id. at 173 (e.g. height and weight requirements disproportionately screening our
female job applicants). In the United States, it is referred to as "disparate impact" dis-
[Vol. I
4
Annals of Health Law, Vol. 1 [1992], Iss. 1, Art. 15
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/annals/vol1/iss1/15
Canada: Children's Rights to Equality
The Supreme Court of Canada has also recognized that inequal-
ity is often a systemic problem-it is not simply a problem of un-
fair or discriminatory individual conduct.' 5 Rather, inequalities
often result from deeply embedded, institutionalized policies and
practices. One significant implication of the recognition of the sys-
temic nature of many problems of inequality is the way it calls into
question an individual complaints model for redressing inequality.
Systemic problems demand proactive, institutional responses, not
individual retroactive responses. The need for special, proactive
programs to redress inequalities is explicitly endorsed in the Cana-
dian Charter. 16 A systemic approach to inequality is particularly
important in the context of children's rights to equality, given ac-
centuated access problems to obtaining legal redress through
litigation.
Finally, the idea of scrutinizing personal and institutional rela-
tionships is an implicit dimension of law. Law regulates human
relations. Identifying the importance of understanding equality
rights in relational terms has been emerging in feminist scholarship
in Canada and the United States. 7 From this relational perspec-
tive, problems of inequality arise when human differences are
viewed hierarchically, along the axes of "dominant/subordinate,
good/bad, up/down, superior/inferior."1 8 It is this process of la-
belling those who are different as inferior or abnormal that is at the
core of inequality. Thus, one critical insight of this scholarship is
the necessity of creating relations of equality across individual and
group differences based on respect for diversity.
In considering the implications for children of these develop-
ments in equality law, it is helpful to begin by exploring the tradi-
tional vision of children in society and the absence of any
conception of equality rights for children within this vision. The
efforts to apply equality protection and non-discrimination provi-
sions to children within the framework of a formal conception of
crimination. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (invalidating a standardized
employment test for disproportionately screening out black applicants).
15. Action travail des femmes v. C.N.R. Co., 1 S.C.R. 1114, 1138-1139 (1987).
16. Canadian Charter, § 15(2) (quoted at note 6).
17. See Minow, Making All the Difference, supra note 1; Audre Lorde, Age, Race, Sex
and Class, in SISTER OUTSIDER - ESSAYS AND SPEECHES BY AUDRE LORDE, at 114-123
(The Crossing Press, Trumansburg, New York 1984); Patricia Monture, Ka-Nin-Geh-
Heh-Gah-E-Sa-Nonh-Yah-Ga, 2 CANADIAN J. WOMEN'S L. 159 (1986); Nitya Duclos,
Lessons of Difference: Feminist Theory on Cultural Diversity, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 325
(1990); Brenda Cossman, A Matter of Difference.- Domestic Contracts and Gender Equal-
ity, 28 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 303 (1990).
18. LORDE, supra note 17, at 114.
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equality as sameness of treatment is then examined. Finally, ex-
plored is the application of the reconceptualization of equality
rights outlined above. Throughout this process, I have been con-
fronted with the complexity of overlapping discriminations against
children (e.g. age, sex, race, disability, religion). Often children,
whose lives are subject to greater state intervention, are particu-
larly vulnerable to racism, sexism, and other types of discrimina-
tion. In the healthcare context, discrimination against children
with disabilities has emerged as a particularly salient concern.
TRADITION AND THE DENIAL OF CHILDREN'S
EQUALITY RIGHTS
Pursuant to a traditional, conservative, and hierarchical vision
of the family and society, children do not have equality rights.
This denial of equality takes two forms: (i) overt unequal treat-
ment, and (ii) paternalistic protection. According to the first, chil-
dren do not have to be treated the same as adults and the norms of
equality are not applicable. Children can be subjected to differen-
tial, harmful treatment. For example, the physical punishment of
children is permitted pursuant to the Canadian Criminal Code,
provided parents or teachers use force for disciplinary reasons and
"the force does not exceed what is reasonable under the circum-
stances." 1 9 Such corporal punishment would be considered assault
if it were done to an adult.
Historically, both the common law and the civil law vested total
power and control over children in their fathers. Even today, de-
spite the emergence of child protection laws, children are still
widely subjected to physical and sexual abuse by their parents. In
their book, The Child and the Law, Nicholas Bala and Kenneth L.
Clarke trace the mistreatment of children from Ancient Rome up
to the Modern Era.20 They explain that until the 19th century, the
child was treated as a possession or chattel of the father. Fathers
could physically abuse or even murder their children without legal
intervention; children could be sold as slaves by their parents.
In Quebec, the Roman concept of patria potestas, which gave
fathers absolute power over their children, was incorporated into
the 1866 Civil Code under the rubric of the concept of "paternal
19. R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, § 43.
20. NICHOLAS BALA & KENNETH L. CLARKE, THE CHILD AND THE LAW (1981).
See also, Yo Kubota, The Protection of Children's Rights in United Nations, INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF CRIMINAL POLICY, Nos. 39 & 40 (New York: Centre for Social
Development and Human Affairs, 1990).
[Vol. I
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authority."' 2' It was not until 1977 that legal sanctioning of un-
scrutinized paternal power was replaced with the current notion of
"parental authority," to be exercised jointly by the mother and the
father. Moreover, the 1977 amendments allowed courts to inter-
vene on behalf of children and deprive parents of their parental
authority if they were not fulfilling their parental obligations. 22
In terms of healthcare issues, denying equality rights to children
has often translated into according total power and control regard-
ing children's health to parents. The ideology of the private sphere
of the family into which the law should not intrude has functioned
to reinforce traditional, hierarchical relations within the family.23
Accordingly, requiring parental consent before a young woman
can obtain an abortion or deferring to parental decisions regarding
their children's medical treatment, regardless of whether or not the
parents have demonstrated their concern and commitment to the
best interests of the child, would be consistent with a traditional-
conservative approach that favors parental rather than children's
rights. Nevertheless, the law has tempered the historical power of
parents by affirming the inherent parens patriae jurisdiction of the
state to protect the best interests of the child.24
The second form of inequality, paternalistic protection, is most
problematic from an ideological perspective. In the late 19th Cen-
tury, special protective legislation was introduced in Canada to re-
dress some of the most egregious forms of child exploitation, such
as child prostitution, exploitation in industrial work, and physical
abuse. The protective legislation was specifically directed at child
welfare, compulsory education, restrictions on child labor, and spe-
cial juvenile corrections institutions.2 5 What is significant about
these protections in terms of equality and children's rights is that
they were premised on the idea that children are not equal to
adults. Because of their vulnerability, children were considered in
21. Bartha Knoppers, From Parental Authority to Judicial Interventionism: The New
Family Law of Quebec, in CONTEMPORARY TRENDS IN FAMILY LAW: A NATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 205, 205-206 (K.Connell-Thouez & B. Knoppers, eds., Toronto: Carswell
1984). See also Frances Schanfield Freedman, The Status, Rights and Protection of the
Child in Quebec, 38 R. DU B. 715 (1978).
22. Knoppers, supra note 21, at 206-207. Quebec also introduced youth protection
legislation in 1964. Youth Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 220.
23. See Frances Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 835, 845-848 (1985).
24. For a judicial discussion of the origins of the parens patriae jurisdiction, see E. v.
Eve, 2 S.C.R. 388, 407-409 (1986). See also Bernard M. Dickens, The Modern Function
and Limits of Parental Rights, 97 L.Q. REV. 462 (1981).
25. BALA & CLARKE, supra note 20, at 2.
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need of special protective legislation. Although the legal reforms
for children in most instances provided important and much
needed protection, they were based on a paternalistic ideology that
reinforced the inequality of children, not on any conception of
equality rights for children.
FORMAL EQUALITY AND CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
There have been developments in the law on children's equality
rights; however, these developments tend to be limited to treating
as adults those children who can show that they are more adult-
like. In other words, children who are basically the same as adults
are entitled to be treated the same as adults. While this conception
of equality limits its applicability to only a small portion of youths
(i.e. those who are almost adults), it is nevertheless important. A
few cases in the healthcare area illustrate how equal treatment to
adults is precisely what some minors want and deserve.
In C. (J.S.) v. Wren,26 for example, a 16 year-old girl became
pregnant and obtained medical approval for an abortion. Her par-
ents, however, opposed the abortion and sought an injunction to
prevent it from being performed. Her parents argued that "chil-
dren should obey their parents and the courts should intervene to
prevent others from interfering with parental control ....
However, the Court concluded that parental control decreases as
the child matures through adolescence and upheld the young
woman's right to make her own decision, writing: "We infer that
she did have sufficient intelligence and understanding to make up
her own mind and did so. At her age and level of understanding,
the law is that she is to be permitted to do So. '12'
In an Ontario case involving a 12 year-old girl, Lisa Dorothy K.,
a court was faced with the difficult decision of whether to respect
the wishes of the young girl not to undergo chemotherapy. 29 Lisa
was suffering from leukemia and the recommended chemotherapy
treatment would require blood transfusions. Because the girl and
26. 49 Alta. L.R. (2d) 289 (1986).
27. Id. at 291.
28. Id. at 292. In reaching this conclusion, the Alberta Court of Appeal relied heav-
ily on Gillick v. West Norfold & Wisbech Area Health Authority, 3 All E.R. 402 (1985)
(allowing a physician to prescribe contraceptives to a girl under age 16 without parental
consent). See also, Catholic Children's Aid Soc'y v. N.R., 47 R.F.L.(2d) 361 (1985);
Edward W. Keyserlingk, The Adolescent Patient and the Family: Some Ethical and Legal
Considerations (from the Proceedings of the 8th Canadian Conference on Pediatrics, Ca-
nadian Pediatrics Society, April, 1990).
29. Re L.D.K.: C.A.S. v. K.[Ont.], 48 R.F.L. 164 (Prov. Ct., Fam. Div. 1985).
[Vol. I
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her parents were Jehovah's Witnesses, they refused to consent to
any treatment that would involve blood transfusions. They wanted
to pursue a mega-vitamin home treatment instead. It was in this
context that proceedings were brought to have the child declared
in need of protection so that the Children's Aid Society could give
the requisite consent for chemotherapy. The girl had already re-
ceived one blood transfusion without her consent.
The Court began by making it clear that the girl was firmly op-
posed to blood transfusions.
L. has told this court clearly and in a matter-of-fact way that, if
an attempt is made to transfuse her with blood, she will fight that
transfusion with all of the strength that she can muster. She has
said and I believe her, that she will scream and struggle and that
she will pull the injecting device out of her arm and will attempt
to destroy the blood in the bag over her bed. I refuse to make
any order which would put this child through that ordeal .... I
am satisfied ... that the emotional trauma which she would expe-
rience... could have nothing but a negative effect on any treat-
ment being undertaken.30
In ruling that L. was entitled to make her own decision, Provicial
Court Judge Main stated:
L. is a beautiful, extremely intelligent, articulate, courteous, sen-
sitive and, most importantly, a courageous person. She has a
wisdom and maturity well beyond her years and I think it would
be safe to say that she has all of the positive attributes that any
parent would want in a child. She has a well thought out, firm
and clear religious belief. In my view, no amount of counselling
from whatever source or pressure from her parents or anyone
else, including an order of this court, would shake or alter her
religious beliefs.
I believe that L.K. should be given the opportunity to fight this
disease with dignity and peace of mind. That can only be
achieved by acceptance of the plan put forward by her and her
parents. 31
In commenting on the fact that L. had received a blood transfusion
against her wishes, the Court referred explicitly to the violation
this entailed of the girl's right to "security of the person"32 and her
30. Id. at 169. In this regard, it is important to note that the Court considered the
benefits of the chemotherapy to be uncertain and held that the child's life was equally in
danger whichever treatment was pursued. Id. at 170. Moreover, the Court maintained
that the proposed hospital treatment "fails to address her emotional needs and her reli-
gious beliefs. It fails to treat the whole person." Id. at 169.
31. Id. at 171.
32. Section 7 of the Canadian Charter states: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty
19921
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right not to be discriminated against on the basis of religion and
age.
Given the intelligence, state of mind and position taken by L., all
of which were known to this hospital, she ought to have been
consulted before being transfused. She was not. I must find that
she has been discriminated against on the basis of her religion
and her age pursuant to s. 15(l)."
The general approach to child consent in medical law is consis-
tent with the basic tenor of these decisions. The law requires pa-
rental consent when very young children need medical treatment,
but acknowledges the rights of children to have input into the deci-
sion in accordance with their level of maturity. As Ellen Picard
has noted: "A person under the age of majority can consent to
medical or dental treatment for his benefit provided he is capable
of appreciating fully the nature and consequences of the particular
treatment. '3 4 This legal principle is often referred to as the "ma-
ture minor rule." In addition, "emancipated minors," young per-
sons who are either married, living on their own, or independent of
their parents, are often considered capable of consenting to medical
treatment.35 In some jurisdictions, specific statutory rules deline-
ate at what age minors are entitled to give consent to medical treat-
ment.36 Of note is the particularly young age of 14, codified in
Quebec, as the age when a minor is competent to give consent to
medical treatment.37
The division of childhood into various phases of increased ma-
turity reflects an understanding of growing up as a gradual and
linear process. A child begins as a total dependent, but gradually
becomes mature and equal to a responsible adult. While there is
no doubt a lot of common sense truth in this depiction of the matu-
ration process, it may also be the case that children have special
capacities that they lose as they grow older. Arlene Skolnick, in an
article entitled The Limits of Childhood: Conceptions of Child De-
and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance
with the principles of fundamental justice."
33. 48 R.F.L. at 171.
34. ELLEN I. PICARD, LEGAL LIABILITY OF DOCTORS AND HOSPITALS IN CANADA
55 (2d ed., Calgary: Carswell 1984).
35. See generally id.; BERNARD M. DICKENS, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF FAMILY
LAW, ch. 6 (Toronto: Butterworths 1979); Philip H. Osborne, The Consent of Minors, in
BARNEY SNEIDERMAN, JOHN C. IRVINE & PHILIP H. OSBORNE, CANADIAN MEDICAL
LAW, at 35 (Toronto: Carswell 1989); LORNE E. ROZOVSKY & FAY A. ROzOVSKY, THE
CANADIAN LAW OF CONSENT TO TREATMENT (Toronto: Butterworths 1990).
36. See RoZOVSKY & ROZOVSKY, supra note 35, at 57-62.
37. Public Health Protection Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. P-35, § 42.
[Vol. I206
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velopment and Social Context,38 suggests that in the psychological
models of child development "the adult has been taken as the
measure of the child."' 39 The adult is assumed to be the fully func-
tioning human being; children are considered to be less than fully
competent individuals.
Such an approach to childhood and growing up has been very
influential in legal thinking. For example, as Justice Wilson of the
Supreme Court of Canada noted in a case involving a young ac-
cused person:
[I]f the legal system is to reflect accurately the view of children as
being in the developmental stages en route to full functioning ca-
pacity as adults, the standard against which children's actions are
measured must be such as can logically culminate in the objective
standard of the ordinary person upon arrival at full adulthood.'
Some psychologists, however, have questioned the linearity of the
developmental model, suggesting that "growing up involves losses
as well as gains-that becoming an adult involves a progressive
impoverishment of the capacity to perceive the world, as one learns
to deaden and distort experience by translating it into the conven-
tional patterns of the culture."4
RECONCEPTUALIZING EQUALITY FOR CHILDREN
While the formal equal treatment model of equality does provide
some important safeguards in the context of age and other types of
discrimination, what about the children who are not mature or
emancipated minors-who are not almost adults, or like adults?
Does the concept of equality have any relevance for them? Pursu-
ant to the equal treatment model, it does not, since treating chil-
dren differently than adults seems to make sense in many contexts.
According to the similarly situated formula of equality, children
who are not similarly situated to adults need not be treated simi-
larly. If we want to make equality rights relevant to the lives of the
very young-the immature minors-the majority of children-we
need to move towards the reconceptualized notion of equality dis-
cussed above.
The first dimension of such a reconceptualization is recognition
that differential treatment may be needed to secure equality of out-
comes. Acknowledging the unequal impact of certain policies and
38. 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 38 (1975).
39. Id. at 55.
40. R. v. Hill, 1 S.C.R. 313, 350 (1986).
41. See Skolnick, supra note 38, at 55.
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accommodating differences has been recognized as integral to
equality. In the context of children's lives generally, this means
that special protective laws and policies for children can be under-
stood actually as a component of equality, not as an exception to it.
Special protection for children recognizes their vulnerability and
lack of power in society. Protective measures are premised on chil-
dren's rights and entitlement to have their special needs and con-
cerns met. Protective measures are not paternalistic privileges that
reinforce the alleged inequality of children.
A clear example of how differential treatment can be essential to
equality in the context of discrimination on the basis of physical
disability is provided by a human rights case involving Tammy
McLeod, an 11 year-old girl with cerebral palsy.42 Although
Tammy used a wheel chair, she was able to participate in commu-
nity bowling with the assistance of a special wooden ramp, until
the local Bowling Association decided to prohibit her participation
because she needed to use the assistive device.43 Tammy and her
mother filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on
the basis of physical disability. In concluding that Tammy should
be allowed to participate in competitive bowling with the "ramp
assist," both the human rights Board of Inquiry and the Ontario
Divisional Court agreed that the rule prohibiting assistive devices
discriminated against persons with physical disabilities. To give
Tammy an equal right to participate with other children in
bowling meant accommodating her special needs by allowing her
to use the wooden ramp.
A second dimension of an approach to equality that goes beyond
the individual equal treatment model is to focus on the institution-
alized and systemic manifestations of inequality. Perhaps the most
obvious systemic contributor to inequality is poverty. For chil-
dren, poverty is widespread. Both Canada and the United States
have high child poverty rates of 16 per cent and 20 per cent respec-
tively. These figures are not inevitable and contrast markedly with
the much lower poverty rates in Norway and Sweden (5.6 per cent
and 5.2 per cent respectively).' In other words, in 1988, there
were approximately one million or one in six children living in pov-
erty in Canada.4 5 Poverty is even more prevalent among First Na-
42. Youth Bowling Council of Ontario v. McLeod, 75 O.R. (2d) 451 (1990).
43. It is noteworthy and reassuring that none of the children complained about
Tammy's use of the wooden ramp.
44. See Children in Poverty: Toward a Better Future, at 5 (Standing Senate Committee
on Social Affairs, Science and Technology, Jan., 1991).
45. Id. at 3-4.
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tions children, with approximately 51% of First Nations children
in Canada living below the poverty line.46 In health terms, this
translates into inadequate housing, inadequate and insufficient
food, a higher risk of being born with a low birth weight, higher
infant mortality rates, and inadequate access to healthcare. Re-
dressing such forms of systemic inequality requires a commitment
of collective resources and proactive institutional initiatives.
The final aspect of a reconceptualized equality right raised is a
relational approach to equality. A relational approach is premised
on the idea that we need to be attentive to the dynamics of personal
and institutional relationships in trying to identify and remedy
problems of inequality. Relations of equality are characterized by
respect for differences and a rejection of the labelling of those who
are different from oneself as either inferior or abnormal. Children
are not inferior to adults-they are different-they have different
incapacities and capacities. We need to respect their differences
and acknowledge their special capacities. We also need to respect
other differences, such as those between boys and girls, between
children without physical disabilities and those with physical disa-
bilities, and between children from different cultural, ethnic, and
religious communities. As noted in the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, the education of the child should include
"preparation of the child for responsible life in a free society, in the
spirit of understanding, peace, tolerance, equality of sexes, and
friendship among all peoples, ethnic, national and religious groups
and persons of indigenous origin. '
It is also helpful to acknowledge the connection between rela-
tions of equality and human caring.4" To care for someone in a
way that enhances equality is to provide support, assistance, ad-
vice, and protection, when it is needed, while teaching the person
being cared for to develop his or her own skills, abilities, sense of
responsibility, and judgment. Paternalism, arguably, provides pro-
tection while entrenching helplessness. An egalitarian conception
of caring provides protection while promoting the development of
the person being cared for. It acknowledges human interdepen-
dency as an integral dimension of social life.49
The case of Justin Clark illustrates how equality rights need to
46. Id. at 9-11.
47. U.N. Resolution, supra note 5, article 29, § l(d).
48. Monture, supra note 17, at 159.
49. See JEAN BAKER MILLER, TOWARDS A NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN (2d ed.,
Boston: Beacon Press 1986).
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be acknowledged in the face of human dependence." Shortly after
his birth, Justin was diagnosed as severely mentally and physically
disabled. He was institutionalized, confined to a bed or wheel-
chair, had very limited upper body mobility, and could not speak.
At the age of 13, Justin was instructed in a special communications
system that opened up an entirely new world for him. In his in-
structor's words:
[h]e taught me-a lot more than I ever taught him initially and
that continued over the years that we worked together. He was
like a sponge. His progress in terms of cognitive development,
his development in terms of perceptions of things was really quite
amazing. He had many, many, many questions that obviously
had been stored up for a lot of years.51
By the age of 18, Justin was recommended for community place-
ment and had arranged to begin visiting possible group homes
when his parents intervened and opposed any community place-
ment. They maintained that Justin was not mentally competent to
consent to community placement. The case then proceeded to liti-
gation on the issue of mental competency. In finding in favor of
Justin, Judge Matheson concluded:
We have, all of us, recognized a gentle, trusting, believing spirit
and very much a thinking human being who has his unique part
to play in our compassionate interdependent society.
And so, in the spirit of that liberty which learned hand tells us
seeks to understand the minds of other men, and remembers that
not even a sparrow falls to earth unheeded, I find and I declare
Matthew Justin Clark to be mentally competent. 52
Though not decided in terms of equality rights, the judicial out-
come in this case implicitly recognized how equality can flourish
despite dependence and largely depends on human relations for its
safeguarding. Thus, it is critical to scrutinize personal, familial,
and institutional relations to discern a complete absence of care or
protection, paternalistic protection that reinforce inequality, or
caring protection that recognizes the interdependency of human
beings, while affirming the possibility of self-realization.
The notion of caring has also been instrumental in deciding who
should be entitled make medical treatment decisions on behalf of
very young children (e.g. family members, physicians, judges).
When the familial relations are caring and loving, and the medical
treatment uncertain, courts are more inclined to defer to the wishes
50. Clark v. Clark, 40 O.R. (2d) 383 (1982).
51. Id. at 386.
52. Id. at 392.
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of family members. 53 Within a relational discourse of equality,
such an outcome may well be consistent with enhancing the equal-
ity of the young child. It also ensures that difficult medical deci-
sions will be made with an appreciation of the contextual realities
of the quality of life, pain, and human dignity.
CONCLUSION
Although the concept of equality has not been relied upon exten-
sively in litigation on behalf of children, it is a concept that has
constitutional and statutory recognition. Articulating its meaning
and applying it in our advocacy is a task that awaits us. I have
tried to canvass the range of meanings that can be attributed to
equality and assessed the implications of each on children's lives.
While the most conceptually straightforward approach is the for-
mal equality model, whereby children who can prove their likeness
to adults are treated like adults, such a model is unduly limited. It
only provides protection to a minority of older youths and it fails
to challenge adulthood as the standard of normalcy. It also re-
quires children to fit into adult norms, even if these are inappropri-
ate and not quite true to the experience of adolescence. Thus, it is
important to take the egalitarian impulse of equality rights beyond
its formal equality mold to make it meaningful for all children. As
a normative principle and legal entitlement, equality demands a
safe, healthy, and loving environment within which children can
grow, learn, create, express themselves fully, and continue to teach
us the importance of living in the present.
53. See, e.g., Couture-Jacquet v. Montreal Children's Hosp., 1 R.J.Q. 1221 (1986); Re
L.D.K.: C.A.S. v. K. [Ont.], 48 R.F.L. 164 (Prov. Ct., Fam. Div. 1985); Saskatchewan
(Ministry of Social Serv.) v. P.(F.), 69 D.L.R. (4th) 134 (1990) (the parents' refusal to
consent was upheld by the courts). In other cases, where there is less evidence of a close
and continuing relationship, courts have ordered treatment. See, e.g., Re S.D. [B.C.], 3
W.W.R. 618 (B.C.S.C. 1983). In some cases where treatment is ordered despite parental
refusal to give consent, principles of non-discrimination against disabled children and a
more absolutist conception of the right to life have been invoked. See, e.g., Re S.D.
[B.C.]; Goyette (In Re:): Centre de Services Sociaux du Montreal Metropolitain, [1983]
C.S. 429; New Brunswick (Min. of Health & Community Serv.) v. B.(R.), 70 D.L.R.
(4th) 568 (1990). See generally MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE, supra note 1,
at 312-349; Dickens, supra note 24.
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